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ABSTRACT 
This research uses two recently introduced observer rating scales, (Shaw et al., 
2013) for the identification and measurement of negative sentiment (the Scale 
for Negativity in Text or SNIT)  and insider risk (Scale of Indicators of Risk in 
Digital Communication or SIRDC)  in communications to test the performance 
of psycholinguistic software designed to detect indicators of these risk factors.   
The psycholinguistic software program, WarmTouch (WT), previously used 
for investigations, appeared to be an effective means for locating 
communications scored High or Medium in negative sentiment by the SNIT or 
High in insider risk by the SIRDC within a randomly selected sample from the 
Enron archive.  WT proved less effective in locating emails Low in negative 
sentiment on the SNIT and Low in insider risk on the SIRDC. However, WT 
performed extremely well in identifying communications from actual insiders 
randomly selected from case files and inserted in this email sample. In 
addition, it appeared that WT’s measure of perceived Victimization was a 
significant supplement to using negative sentiment alone, when it came to 
searching for actual insiders.  Previous findings ( Shaw et al., 2013) indicate 
that this relative weakness in identifying low levels of negative sentiment may 
not impair WT’s usefulness for identifying communications containing 
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significant indications of insider risk because of the very low base rate and low 
severity of insider risk at Low levels of negative sentiment (Shaw et al., 2013). 
Although many of the “false positives” acquired in the successful search for 
actual insiders in this experiment were shown to be true positives for other 
forms of insider risk, WT still produced fairly high rates of false positives that 
could burden analysts, as described by the search times provided. As further 
research and development proceeds to address this problem, we again 
recommend the use of WT in an integrated multi-disciplinary array of detection 
methods that will serve as an initial screen to narrow the search for individuals 
at-risk for insider activities. The implications for insider threat research, 
detection and prevention are discussed.  
Keywords: Insider Risk, Digital Communication, Disgruntlement, Detecting, 
Negative Sentiment, Threat, Employee Anger, Workplace Violence, Content 
Analysis, Automated Psychological assessment, Psycholinguistic software 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Shaw et al. (2013) have summarized the long-documented association between 
employee disgruntlement and counter-productive work behaviors (CWB), 
including insider attacks and violations. They also discussed the unexplored 
and complicated theoretical relationship between expressed negative sentiment 
and insider risk and described the first published empirical data to address such 
basic questions as what percentage of organizational emails contain negative 
sentiment and what percentage of this content also contains indicators of 
insider risk. Using two new observational rating scales of negative sentiment 
(the Scale of Negativity in Text or SNIT) and insider risk (Scale of Insider 
Risk in Digital Content or the SIRDC) with a random sample of emails from 
the Enron Archive, this study found that low levels of negative sentiment were 
found in 20% of the sample and that Moderate and High levels of negative 
sentiment were extremely rare, occurring in less than 1% of communications.  
Less than 4% of the sampled emails displayed indicators of insider risk on the 
SIRDC. Emails containing High levels of insider risk comprised less than one 
percent of the total sample.  Of the emails containing negative sentiment in the 
sample, only 16.3% also displayed indicators of insider risk. However, the 
odds of a communication containing insider risk increased with the level of 
negative sentiment.  All of the emails found to contain insider risk indicators 
on the SIRDC displayed some level of negative sentiment. The authors 
concluded that searching communications for insider risk using mainly 
negative sentiment produces an extremely high false positive rate (over 84%) 
and that communications with low levels of negative sentiment are particularly 
unlikely to yield true positives.  They also suggested that research efforts 
utilizing email collections without moderate-to-high levels of negative 
sentiment are unlikely to be useful due to their lack of inclusion of individuals 
with actual insider potential.   
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Clearly, communications containing negative sentiment are not rare, but 
communications with insider risk variables overlap with these communications 
and are extremely rare, complicating efforts to identify at-risk individuals 
through their communications. While human coders can reliably distinguish 
emails with negative sentiment, with and without insider risk, it is not practical 
or desirable from a privacy perspective, to deploy human readers in a search 
for these rare communications. While numerous risk detection systems have 
been deployed to detect technical behaviors associated with insider risk 
(anomalous system use, technical security violations, behavior consistent with 
more complex insider risk models (see Shaw and Stock, 2011) there are no 
available computerized systems designed to detect negative sentiment and 
other insider risk indicators in content beyond key word identification or 
document proliferation trackers adapted from legal review systems.  Although 
a number of automated systems for detecting negative and other sentiment 
have appeared on the market, these software packages mainly target very 
general consumer, employee and media sentiment, rather than CWB risk in 
communications.  Among the multiple computer-assisted software programs 
designed to identify and measure qualitative content in electronic media, very 
few focus on the emotional states and psychological characteristics of 
particular individuals, and none do so for the purpose of assessing risk to 
others. The overwhelming majority of Qualitative Data Analyzers (QDAs) or 
Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) are 
primarily designed for commercial concerns, reputation management, and 
targeted opinion monitoring.   These systems are not equipped with specialized 
scales that include individual psychological indicators to detect insider risk.  
They do not identify and measure the psychological state of the author or 
provide data on other psychological characteristics of individuals linked to 
insider risk. 
A system that could identify levels of negative sentiment and insider risk of 
concern to security, counter-intelligence, and fraud analysts and investigators 
could assist them in narrowing their search for suspects in these investigations.  
For example, the search for individuals with access, capability and/or technical 
or other risk indicators could be further narrowed by identifying disgruntled 
subjects within this suspect pool. With input from other multi-disciplinary data 
sources (Human Resources, Security, Financial), such a system could also help 
identify individuals with greater levels of disgruntlement than their peers, or 
increased levels of  insider risk factors compared to their previous levels.    
The availability of a corporate email sample reliably coded for negative 
sentiment and insider risk provided the opportunity to test the ability of 
psycholinguistic content analysis software to identify such at-risk 
communications. In addition to the system’s ability to screen communications 
for signs of risk within this sample, this design also allowed for the insertion of 
actual insider emails (and communications from other criterion groups) into the 
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corpus to evaluate the system’s sensitivity and false positive rate for these 
communications. This section provides a brief overview of the software being 
evaluated and its expected limitations, followed by a description of the 
research design utilized and the results obtained. The implications for the use 
of psycholinguistic software in insider investigations and detection efforts will 
then be discussed in light of these findings and the results from the previous 
article (Shaw et. al., 2013). 
1.1 Background on WarmTouch (WT) Psycholinguistic Software
1
 
WT was previously described in Shaw and Stroz (2004) and was designed as a 
tool to help investigators and analysts discover trends in communications 
relevant to a subject’s emotional and psychological state, attitudes toward 
others, decision-making processes, and communication preferences.  While its 
variables are derived, in part, from content analysis approaches to leadership 
analysis (Hermann, 1980; Shaw, 2003; Weintraub, 1986; Winter, Hermann, 
Weintraub, and Walker, 1991), personality, and threat assessment (Shaw, 
2006), it has mainly been used to: 
 Detect signs of disgruntlement and other insider risk factors in online 
communications of individuals previously identified as at-risk for 
insider problems. 
 Assess the risk posed by the psychological state and attitudes of 
anonymous individuals making threats. 
 Compare the psycholinguistic patterns of anonymous and known 
individuals to help determine the authorship and identity of unknown 
persons. 
 Evaluate the communication preferences and dominant decision-
making processes of these subjects to aid in case management. 
 Describe the frequency and valence of communication between parties 
for the purpose of understanding relationship patterns and locating 
patterns indicative of risk. 
 Assess the communication preferences and decision-making styles of 
parties of interest from their communication in order to understand, 
enhance or impact relationships (Shaw and Stroz, 2004).   
 WT’s deployment in illustrative cases is detailed in Shaw and Stroz 
(2004). WT has also been applied to the risk assessment of persons 
suspected of terrorist activities within American companies abroad, 
analysis, profiling and management of persons engaged in cyber 
                                                     
1
 WarmTouch and its use of psycholinguistic algorithms for detecting insider risk is 
protected by US Patents 7,058,566; 7,225,122; 7,346,492; 7,395,201; 7,526,426; 
7,801,724; 7,881,924; 8,078,453. 
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extortion, and insiders participating in espionage, sabotage and 
presenting violence risk  (O’Brien, 2005; Shaw and Stroz, 2004).  
WT utilizes two different psycholinguistic approaches to perform these tasks.  
Its variables include psycholinguistic algorithms derived from the academic 
content analysis literature and linguistic dictionaries designed to correspond to 
specific psychological states or issues. In our experience the combination of 
these approaches makes detection of specific psychological states characterized 
by general arousal more likely. For example, disgruntled individuals may 
express their feelings of anger and victimization through the use of specific 
words with psycholinguistic meanings that form our algorithms (negatives as 
indicative of anger, the use of the word “me” as indicative of feelings of 
victimization). However, in some cases they may also simply threaten an anti-
social act without exhibiting a marked change in these variables (e.g., “I will 
kill you,” scored as instrumental aggression and a key threat word).  It was 
therefore important in the development process that WT be able to detect both 
types of risk indicators. In addition, our experience indicates that there is some 
degree of overlap in the psycholinguistic expression of aroused states (anger, 
anxiety, depression), and that while the psychological algorithms used are good 
at detecting arousal, the psychological dictionaries are extremely useful for 
defining the specific psychological state involved. For example, in our case 
experience, angry, depressed and anxious individuals tend to show elevated 
levels of self-references (“I” and “me”), direct references to others, negatives, 
adverbial intensifiers, and negative feelings compared to controls. However, 
dictionary scales designed to differentiate these states are helpful in 
distinguishing them from each other. For example, the use of words such as 
“sad,” “blue,” and “bummed” versus “worried,” “nervous,” and “agitated” help 
us differentiate depression from anxiety. 
As noted above, WT uses a number of traditional psycholinguistic content 
analysis coding schemes derived from work with written and spoken samples 
of leadership and patient verbal behavior described in the WT codebook (Shaw 
and Wirth-Beaumont, 2004). However, in the process of applying these 
measures to the online communication of general employee populations, 
persons in significant psychological distress, and forensic populations, we have 
been both supporting and revising the psycholinguistic interpretation of many 
of these variables. For example, in his work with patient populations and 
leaders, Weintraub (1989) found that the use of the word “me” at relatively 
high levels was indicative of passivity. This followed logically from the 
overwhelming tendency for “me” to be used as a pronoun denoting the receipt 
of action by others. Consistent with this finding, in our cases involving insiders 
we have found “me” to be an excellent marker of perceived victimization in the 
written and online communications of disgruntled and other forensic subjects. 
We will therefore also test the sensitivity of this measure of Victimization to 
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disgruntled insiders as a supplement to the less sensitive performance of 
negative sentiment alone, described in the earlier article (Shaw et. al., 2013). 
Weintraub (1989) also did not subdivide his variable of Evaluators (judgments 
regarding positive or negative aspects or characteristics) and Feelings (either 
positive or negative expressions of emotions) into negative and positive 
categories.  In studying individuals at-risk, versus leadership populations, we 
have found this subdivision useful. 
Because the effectiveness of the WT psychological dictionary of terms will 
depend on its ability to capture the way specific subjects experience and 
communicate their thoughts and feelings online, they require regular revision 
when new subject groups are examined. For example, during a recent 
assignment monitoring the communication of employees suspected to be 
members of a potentially violent Islamic fundamentalist group, the WT 
dictionary was revised to include new terms in previous categories including 
depersonalization (“kafir,” “infidel”), dangerous religiousness (“jahiliyya,” 
“shahid”), negative evaluators (“against allah,” “crusader”), negative feelings 
(“wrathful”), etc. Thus, prior to the deployment of WT in a new setting, 
updated vocabulary research is undertaken. 
1.2 Use of WT in the identification of individuals at-risk for insider  
acts from within an email or other digital communication cache 
WT was not originally designed to be used alone to locate individuals at-risk 
for insider acts due to their display of disgruntlement or other risk factors in 
their communications. Nor would we recommend its lone use for this purpose.  
However, we wanted to test the sensitivity and specificity of WT as a screening 
tool to help analyst reduce the number of communications to be reviewed in 
their efforts to locate potentially at-risk individuals,  in combination with other 
risk detection approaches, such as signs of technical behavioral anomalies or 
variations from baseline compared to a subject’s group or his own behavior 
(unusual downloading or copying) or consistency with more advanced models 
of insider risk (see summary by Shaw and Stock, 2011). For example, insider 
threat analysts utilizing technical risk indicators are often overwhelmed by the 
number of “alerts” that might indicate the presence of risk and have difficulty 
prioritizing their resources to investigate this feedback. However, a parallel 
system that could provide additional information about the likely level of 
disgruntlement in an individual could help prioritize these efforts.  
1.3 How does WT Work? 
When it comes to using WT as a screening tool to search an email or other 
communication cache for individuals at-risk for insider or other related 
problems, WT presents several options. First, WT can conduct a very broad 
search according to a wide variety of psycholinguistic criteria, casting a broad 
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net. Or, WT can search a communications cache for a very narrow selection of 
emails fitting very specific criteria. For example, in a search for emails 
containing negative sentiment, a WT analyst would select a list of 
psycholinguistic variables sensitive to negative emotions or beliefs, including 
some specialized variables sensitive to particular states applicable to insiders.  
Table A1 in the Appendix displays a list of WT search variables that might be 
selected for a broad search for negative sentiment, including some of these 
specialized categories.   
In a search for individuals exhibiting just Disgruntlement (feelings of anger, 
victimization, and identification of someone to blame) a WT user might 
request a narrower search based on a choice of negatives, negative evaluators, 
and references to the term “me.” Second, the WT user might decide he would 
like to see those communications with the highest score on insider risk 
variables of concern and for this purpose WT produces a list of top scorers in 
these categories by email address. In a third approach, the WT user must 
decide which segment of the distribution of subject communications displaying 
the selected characteristics is of interest. For example, WT will automatically 
supply descriptive statistics for the distribution of the variable of interest and 
the user may request all emails above the mean in a very broad sweep or just 
those emails one standard deviation above the mean—a narrower and extreme 
group of communications. Often through a process of trial and error, the user 
familiar with the communication culture of their organization will need to 
balance the risk of missing true positives by using a narrower search against 
the risks of finding numerous false positives by using a broader search. In our 
earlier experience with the full Enron Archive, for example, we have found that 
a narrow search focusing on emails one-half a standard deviation above the 
mean value best balances these concerns. After WT returns all of the emails 
fitting the selected variables (and, optionally, ranks these email in order of 
concern), the user has several additional options. First, the user may wish to 
filter out emails containing the specified variables that are not of interest due to 
their content. Newsletters, sports discussions groups, forwarded articles, 
advertisements, spam, routine technical reports on system outages, and other 
non-germane material that often contains negative content may be filtered by 
using key words from the subject line. The user can also filter by date, author, 
recipient, or author affiliation as indicated by the email address. We 
recommend doing this after WT’s initial installation in order to save analysts 
time later. The system will then offer the user several approaches to “drill 
down” into the communications discovered, including the ability to examine all 
of the email from a particular author by time, recipients, or other WT 
characteristics. A particularly useful WT function in investigations is to 
examine the email of an identified subject to determine the frequency and 
emotional tone of his correspondence with others in his communications 
network. This view of an author’s email frequency and tone toward others can 
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map a communication network revealing internal conflicts and coalitions that 
may play a role in insider investigations. 
1.4 WT limitations 
Compared to human coders, WT currently has several limitations that may 
limit its effectiveness as a screening tool for locating communications 
displaying negative sentiment and insider risk. First, the current version of WT 
is not able to detect many of the more subtle variables described on the SNIT 
that imply, rather than overtly state, negative sentiment. These categories may 
include sarcasm, irony, non-negative statements denoting author upset (“there 
should be an accounting”) or implying criticism, opposition, or protest 
indirectly (“I’ve done my best for the Company”). Second, if a specific 
dictionary term is not in one of WT’s vocabulary lists it will not be detected. 
Unless one of WT’s non-dictionary algorithms detects an alternative risk 
indicator, such words may not be correctly scored. As noted above, it is 
therefore critical to update WT vocabulary lists for use with different 
populations or groups. Third, the current version of WT has a limited ability to 
determine whether the negativity detected is directed toward an individual or 
group noted in the content or a less critical topic that does not necessarily 
constitute a risk. For example, WT will not be able to determine whether an 
author is enraged at his football team’s performance or a coworker mentioned 
in the communication. This handicap can be expected to produce “false 
positive” results which may or may not be of interest. For example, some 
analysts may be interested in such an angry display, no matter whom the target. 
Subsequent modifications to WT using more advanced linguistic algorithms 
are expected to address this concern. 
While we do not expect WT or another computerized system utilizing other 
approaches (e.g., Computational Linguistics) to perform as well as human 
coders, the initial or full scale review of the content of an email cache by 
human coders is not a practical or desirable alternative in most settings. We 
therefore sought to determine WT’s relative strengths and weaknesses as an 
initial screening tool for this task so that its limitations may be understood by 
users.   
1.5 Research Questions 
As the broad range of WT variables in Table A1 in the Appendix indicates, 
there are many ways to use WT as a screening tool to examine an email cache 
for indicators of negative sentiment and insider risk. Specific WT variables 
may also be better suited for different criterion groups, such as WT variables 
for the detection of anger, depression, and anxiety with those respective 
cohorts.  This part of the research was designed to address the following basic 
questions regarding WT’s performance: 
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 What percentage of emails categorized as High, Medium, or Low on 
the SNIT contained in the Enron sample did WT correctly identify? 
 How many additional emails did WT select in the process of 
identifying the above communications that were not identified by the 
SNIT (false positives) that an analyst using WT would have to review? 
 What percentage of the emails categorized as High or Low on the 
SIRDC did WT correctly identify in the Enron sample?   
 How many additional emails did WT select in the process of 
identifying these communications that were not identified by the 
SIRDC (false positives) that an analyst using WT would have to 
review? 
 What percentage of the actual communications from documented 
insiders did WT correctly identify? 
 How many additional emails did WT select in the process of 
identifying the actual insider’s communications that were not from 
insiders (false positives) that an analyst using WT would have to 
review? 
 What percentage of these “false positives” identified in the process of 
searching for actual insiders would also be of interest or concern to an 
analyst or investigator? 
 To what extent is WT’s scoring correlated with the SNIT and SIRDC 
in time series assessments of individual variations in risk with 
established perpetrators, and specifically, what is the correlation 
between SNIT and SIRDC scores and WT measures for the online 
stalker described in Shaw et al. (2013)? 
 Given the results described in Shaw et al. (2013) indicating that 
communications containing insider risk indicators are more likely to be 
contained in emails Moderate-to-High in negative sentiment, is WT a 
useful instrument for identifying this target group? 
 Does WT have any feature that can supplement the false positive 
problem associated with using negative sentiment alone to detect 
insider risk? 
2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This assessment of WT was conducted with 1,000 randomly selected Enron 
emails described in Shaw et al. (2013). In addition, ten actual insider emails 
randomly selected from the principal investigator’s case archive were also 
entered into the database, raising the number of emails to 1010. To test WT’s 
performance, two different search strategies were used—a broad search 
corresponding to a sweep for negative sentiment, and a narrow search 
corresponding to a sweep for disgruntlement. The broad search for negative 
sentiment was conducted for emails containing any of the WT variables 
associated with negative sentiment measured above the group mean. The 
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narrower search was conducted for emails reflecting simple disgruntlement that 
were one-half a standard deviation above the mean. The selection of one-half a 
standard deviation above the mean for this search was a compromise between 
the risks of false and true positive results. We did not want to limit the search 
by filtering-out all emails one standard deviation above the mean risking the 
loss of actual insiders or true positives. On the other hand we did not want to 
burden analysts with an excessive number of false positives by simply 
reviewing all emails above the mean. We were also informed in our selection 
of search criteria by the earlier results in Shaw et al. (2013) indicating that 
most insiders and at-risk individuals will be located at High or Medium versus 
Low levels of negative sentiment or insider risk factors.   
2.1 Broad Search for Negative Sentiment 
Table 1 below summarizes WT’s performance compared to the SNIT results.  
As the table indicates, WT performed extremely well at locating 
communications either High or Medium in negative sentiment as coded by the 
SNIT. WT did not perform well at locating emails scored Low on negative 
sentiment on the SNIT.  WT missed 56% of Low Sentiment emails in its 
Negative Sentiment search mode, and 78% of emails scored Low in negative 
sentiment in its Disgruntlement search mode. However, we did not expect the 
narrow Disgruntlement search to function well in the selection of broader 
negative sentiment. As noted above, communications from this Low negative 
sentiment group are unlikely to contain seriously disgruntled individuals at-risk 
for insider acts. WT also produced a seemingly significant rate of false 
positives in both modes, displaying its limited ability to exercise the judgments 
attributed to human coders discussed above.  Other approaches to these 
searches and future testing might improve these results. We also wanted to 
gauge the labor burden of filtering false positives on the analyst. Therefore 
Table 1 also contains the timed results for these searches.   
Table 2 displays WT’s performance compared to human coders utilizing the 
SIRDC. As the table indicates, WT did extremely well at locating emails coded 
High in Insider Risk. WT performed less well at locating emails Low in Insider 
Risk as coded by the SIRDC. In the Negative Sentiment search mode, WT 
missed 35% of Low SIRDC emails and 59% in Disgruntled search mode.  
However, we did not expect a search for negative sentiment to do well in 
locating SIRDC subject communications. 
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Table 1 WT accuracy compared to SNIT: 220 of 1010 randomly selected Enron emails 
identified as High, Medium or Low in negative sentiment;  
WT searches using sweeps for negative sentiment and disgruntlement 
% Subjects 
Scoring 
High, Medium or 
Low on SNIT 
Identified 
By WT by Search 
Type 
High 
SNIT 
Score 
N=6 
Medium 
SNIT 
Score 
N= 9 
Low 
SNIT 
Score 
N=207 
False Positives or Emails 
identified by WT with no 
SNIT Score 
WT Negative 
Sentiment Search 
Algorithm 
100% 
6/6 
100% 
9/9 
43% 
89/207 
1010 Emails were reduced to 
180 emails or 18% of total cache 
after search and filtering.  
Analyst had to “review” 155 
extra emails to locate 15 High or 
Medium in Negative Sentiment 
and 89 Low in Negative 
Sentiment (this review took 
approximately 35 minutes).WT 
missed 116 emails Low in 
Negative Sentiment or 56% of 
the Low Negative Sentiment 
Group 
 
WT Disgruntlement 
Search Algorithm 
100% 
6/6 
100% 
9/9 
22% 
46/207 
1010 Emails were reduced to 67 
after search and filtering or 7% 
of the cache.  6 of these 67 
emails or 9% were “false 
positives.” Analysts had to 
review 6 extra emails to locate 
15 in the High or Medium SNIT 
group and 46 in the Low SNIT 
group (this took approximately 4 
minutes). WT missed 78% of the 
Low SNIT emails. 
 
 
Table 3 below displays WT’s performance detecting the emails from the ten 
actual insiders inserted into the Enron cache. As Table 3 indicates, WT in 
Disgruntlement mode captured all 10 of these insiders. However, we also 
examined whether WT’s effectiveness in detecting actual insiders would be 
reduced if we used only negative sentiment indicators for the search. As the 
second row of Table 3 indicates, the removal of the term “me,” a WT measure 
of perceived Victimization that does not represent an overtly negative 
sentiment, reduced the effectiveness of the search result by 30%. 
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Table 2 WT accuracy compared to SIRDC: 36 of 1010 randomly selected Enron emails 
identified as High or Low in insider risk;  
WT search using negative sentiment and disgruntlement algorithms 
% Emails 
Scoring High 
or Low on 
SIRDC 
Identified by 
WT Search 
Type 
High 
SIRDC 
Score 
N=2 
Low 
SIRDC 
Score 
N=34 
WT Results and False Positives and Missed 
Communications 
Negative 
Sentiment 
Search 
Algorithm 
100% 
2/2 
65% 
22/34 
1010 Emails reduced to 180 after Search and 
Filtering or 18% of cache.  155 of 180 (86%) 
were “false positives” so that analyst had to 
review 155 extra emails to locate 24/36 
containing insider risk.  WT missed 12 emails 
or 35% of emails Low in Insider Risk   
 
Disgruntlement 
Search 
Algorithm 
100% 
2/2 
41% 
14/34 
1010 Emails filtered to 67 or 7% of Cache.  51 
emails or 76% of these were false positives.  
Analyst had to search 51 extra emails to locate 
16 containing insider risk.  WT missed 20 Low 
Insider risk emails or 59% of Low SIRDC 
emails 
 
 
Table 3 refers to the false positive rate of WT in quotations because although 
analysts would have had to review up to 57 extra emails to locate the ten 
insiders, a significant number of these emails would not be considered false 
positives by analysts concerned about insider risk. For example, of the 57 
emails reviewed to locate the ten insiders, 70% had SNIT scores and 21% had 
SIRDC scores.  Examples of such “false positives” in the search for true 
insiders are displayed in Table A2 in the Appendix, along with their subject 
headers, SNIT, and SIRDC scores. Examples of these “false positives” include 
content concerning interpersonal and professional disgruntlement, possible 
fraud, and injustice attributions. Legal and security staff at several commercial 
and government offices where WT is being test bedded have reported that the 
damage and labor costs associated with insider activities has been so severe 
that the additional labor involved in screening for false positives is well worth 
the effort when true positives can be located. 
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Table 3 Percentage of true insider emails located by WT by search type 
2.2 WT Correlation with SNIT and SIRDC in Time Series  
Evaluation of the Online Stalker 
Although WT may be relatively less sensitive to Low levels of negative 
sentiment and insider risk, we examined whether WT measures correlated with 
SNIT and SIRDC results over time across both High and Low levels when 
tracking the emotional state and risk of an actual insider. While WT’s relative 
insensitivity to Low levels of negative sentiment and insider risk currently 
limits its usefulness to detect these groups, WT could still be used to monitor 
previously identified subjects at any level if its measures parallel those of the 
SNIT and SIRDC.     
Figure 1 below displays the original SNIT and SIRDC values for the 17 stalker 
emails described in Shaw et al. (2013) with the WT Disgruntlement measure 
used in this research for the narrow search. For the purpose of comparison in 
this case study, the WT, SNIT, and SIRDC values have been normalized per 
100 words to better control for the wide variations in the length of the stalker’s 
emails. As Figure 1 portrays, the WT variable of Disgruntlement (composed of 
Negative Evaluators, Negatives, and Me) tracked closely with the SNIT and 
SIRDC over the 17 emails, peaking just prior to the physical attack and 
subsiding afterwards.  Disgruntlement was highly correlated with both the 
SNIT (r=.867, p<.01, bilateral) and the SIRDC (r=.628, p<.05, bilateral) across 
the 17 emails. 
It was interesting to note WT’s lack of correlation with the SNIT and SIRDC 
on Stalker email number 9, which read simply “Your credibility is gone here. 
You should follow.” While human coders easily picked up the negativity in 
WT Search Type 
10 Insider 
Emails 
WT Results and “False Positives” 
Search for Disgruntlement 
With Victimization 
10/10 (100%) 
1010 Emails reduced to 67 after search 
and filtering or less than 7% of cache.  
Analyst had to search 57 extra emails 
to locate 10 True Positives (which 
took approximately 12 minutes). 
Search for Disgruntlement 
Without Victimization 
  
7/10 (70%) 
1010 Emails reduced 112 or 11% of 
the cache and then 66 with filtering.  
Analysts had to review 59 additional 
emails to locate 7 true positives.  WT 
missed 3 or 30% of true positives 
without Victimization. 
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these statements, the search version WT variables used for this research did not 
include the WT variable Direct References (“you’), which would have scored 
both these phrases. However, WT is not yet programmed to detect the 
negativity communicated by the negative reference to “credibility” as “gone” 
or to “you” and “should leave.” Further analysis is underway to understand the 
relative divergence between the WT and SNIT and SIRDC scores. In particular 
we hope to explore whether WT’s Disgruntlement algorithm is more sensitive 
to some forms of insider risk than the SNIT or SIRDC, whether these 
divergences are false positives (WT is scoring terms that do not necessarily 
indicate risk), or whether WT is missing true positive indicators as in the 
examples above.  
 
 
Figure 1 Comparison of Normalized SNIT, SIRDC and WT Disgruntlement Scores 
across 17 Stalker Emails 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
WT appears to be an effective means for locating communications scored High 
or Medium in negative sentiment by the SNIT or High in insider risk by the 
SIRDC. WT proved less effective in locating emails Low in negative sentiment 
on the SNIT and Low in insider risk on the SIRDC. However, WT performed 
extremely well in identifying communications from actual insiders randomly 
selected from case files. In addition, it appeared that WT’s measure of 
perceived Victimization was a significant supplement to using negative 
sentiment alone, when it came to identifying actual insiders. Finally, WT’s 
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correlation with the SNIT and SIRDC over time in the online stalker case 
indicates that its sensitivity to changes in psychological variables is closely 
correlated with these human ratings and that it is also sensitive to changes over 
time associated with violence risk.  
3.1 Implications for Detecting Communications Containing Insider Risk 
While we have not yet identified a single target or criterion group for searches 
to identify individuals at-risk for insider issues, there has been some progress 
in this regard. Based on the preliminary findings from Shaw et al. (2013), 
individuals likely to be at-risk for insider actions may present psycholinguistic 
characteristics such as High or Medium levels of negative sentiment, as 
measured on the SNIT; High levels of insider risk indicators, as measured on 
the SIRDC; and some level of perceived victimization or mistreatment. As 
noted in Shaw et al. (2013), the frequency of insider risk subsides as negative 
sentiment declines. 
WT was not designed as a single tool for identifying disgruntled individuals at 
risk for insider actions.  Rather, it was designed to be used in conjunction with 
other tools (such as technical anomaly detection measures) and more complex 
models of insider risk, to serve as an initial screen to help narrow a field of 
subjects to reduce the false positive rate associated with locating individuals at-
risk for insider violations.  In this assessment of WT for this purpose, the 
system performed extremely well in identifying communications determined 
by human coders to be High and Medium in negative sentiment and High in 
insider risk factors. It also performed extremely well in identifying 
communications from established insiders. However, WT does not appear to be 
an effective means to identify and measure the full range of negative 
sentiment—it does not perform well compared to human coders at the Low 
range of negative sentiment. 
However, results from Shaw et al. (2013) and this research indicate that this 
relative weakness may not impair WT’s usefulness for identifying 
communications containing significant indications of insider risk because of 
the very low base rate of insider risk at Low levels of negative sentiment. WT 
may not be effective for early identification of persons with Low levels of 
negative sentiment that may turn into individuals at-risk for insider activity. 
However, the low base rate of 16.3% for communications with negative 
sentiment that also contain insider risk and the exclusively low insider risk 
scores within this group, indicate that the vast majority of these subjects 
present either little or no risk of insider actions. It may be unethical to target 
these individuals without statistical evidence that they have such risk factors. 
Further time series research will be necessary to determine whether this group 
Low in negative sentiment and insider risk ever converts to more concerning 
risk levels. Or, whether this low level of negative sentiment is a common 
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manifestation of discontent present in many groups. However, WT’s relative 
lack of sensitivity to lower levels of negative sentiment and insider risk in 
search mode would not limit its use in monitoring previously identified 
individuals with higher levels of these risk factors or other sources of concern 
regarding risk. This appeared to be true in the case study of the online stalker 
presented above, where WT’s measure of disgruntlement followed, and was 
correlated with, observer ratings using the SNIT and SIRDC at both high and 
low levels of negative sentiment and insider risk.  
Although many of the “false positives” acquired in the successful search for 
actual insiders in this experiment were shown to be true positives for other 
forms of insider risk, WT still produced fairly high rates of false positives that 
could burden analysts. We have tried to communicate the extent of this 
potential burden by including data on the actual time taken by our users to 
filter false positives. As further research and development proceeds to address 
this problem, we again recommend the use of WT in an integrated multi-
disciplinary array of detection methods that will serve as an initial screen to 
narrow the search for at-risk individuals using other forms of behavior 
associated with this target group.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1 Description of WT Psycholinguistic Search Variables 
Variable Variable Description and Examples 
Negative Evaluators 
Includes negative or pejorative judgment words, not an affect or a 
negation; describes characteristics of a person, group, action, or 
situation– Stupid; abuse; psycho, bad, poor, loser 
Negative Feelings Affectively negative response or experience–Aggravate; cranky; rage 
Negatives 
A term that specifically opposes, negates or contradicts– No,  not,  
never, words with n’t suffix (won’t) contradict 
Adverbial Intensifiers 
Adverbs or other modifiers that increase the power of a statement–So, 
very, really, too  
Anger (algorithm) 
A combination of negative terms such as negative evaluators and 
feelings along with personal pronouns corrected by content that 
modifies or ameliorates the negative statement  
Anger (vocabulary) 
A list of terms associated with the expression of anger–Hate, angry, 
dislike, pissed, irritated 
Anxiety (algorithm) A combination of retractors + qualifiers + neg feelings + explainers 
Anxiety (vocabulary) A list of terms associated with anxiety-Worried, concerned, afraid  
Depression 
(algorithm) 
A combination of I + me + negative feelings + negative evaluators + 
adverbial intensifiers 
Depressed 
(vocabulary) 
A list of words associated with depression--Sad, blue, bummed, 
depressed, guilty, despondent, crushed, heart-broken 
Instrumental 
Aggression 
Terms referring to weapons or violent means, shows instrumental 
intention to harm; distinguished from anger in that anger involves 
emotion, rather than intention with method 
Victimization 
words describing an author’s belief that they have been the subject of 
unfair, unjust, biased or otherwise prejudicial or persecutory actions 
Trapped 
words describing an author’s psychological state in which he or she 
believes their options are very narrow and they have little or no choice 
but to act 
Sexuality 
references body parts, sexuality or sexual acts that also tend to reduce 
persons to objects 
Dehumanization 
Includes disparaging remarks, disparaging names or slurs that treat 
target as object, inhuman, making attack easier 
Disgruntlement 
(algorithm) 
A combination of negatives for anger, me for victimization and direct 
references indicating the possible presence of someone to blame 
Disgruntlement 
(Long) (algorithm) 
Disgruntlement above plus additional variables that capture added 
personalization (I), added anger (negative evaluators and feelings) 
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Table 2 Examples of “False Positives” in WT Search for True Insiders by Subject Line, 
excerpt, SNIT and SIRDC Score 
Subject Line Excerpt 
SNIT 
Score 
SIRDC 
Score 
 
I’m so depressed about the whole thing. Rayfael feels 
bad too, but it’s important he not be near death 
anytime we’re together…He feels like the bad guy. 
And I feel like a bad father!!!  
54 5.67 
Organizational 
Announcement 
It is with great regret that I announce that Jeff Skilling 
is leaving Enron…I regret his decision…our stock 
price has suffered substantially… 
13 2.0 
Demand Kenneth 
Lay donate 
proceeds from 
Enron Stock Sales 
…while you netted well over $100 million many of 
Enron’s employees were financially devastated when 
the company declared bankruptcy and their retirement 
plans were wiped out 
26 12.33 
No subject 
Looks like I’ll be rotating out of this job just in time. 
Jeff said Louise is just like Shankman. Yikes…We’ve 
decided not to tell Binh anything about her. Lavo 
stresses her out… 
17 1.33 
ALSO URGENT 
AND 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Diomedes is going to jump all over me...the 
implications are much broader and we don’t want to 
come off looking dishonest to our own people. And, 
believe me the rumors are out there. I just don’t want 
to make it worse… 
32 6.67 
Re: Directions 
Damn’it Jeff. I don’t have time…The panic is my 
waste of time trying to get things organized. That’s 
the panic… 
34.67 0.0 
Re: Hey 
You must be having a bad day!!!But you know it’s 
not my fault… 
15.0 0.0 
Re: Pacific Virgo 
I am concerned about this expert’s conclusions, the 
most troubling of which is that our putting the ship on 
notice of the end use of the cargo would have been of 
so little importance 
10.0 2.67 
Re: PHC 
Statement 
I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN SUPPORT PRICE 
CAPS… If we could not support them on the 
wholesale side, how can we support on the retail side? 
Doesn’t it kill the ESP business? WE MUST STICK 
WITH THE PRINCIPLES WE FOUGHT FOR ALL 
THESE YEARS—SOME THINGS ARE JUST 
WORTH FIGHTING FOR…the result of the knee-
jerk, weekly about-face by the CPUC which cannot 
possible be considered to be reasoned… 
84 5.0 
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